← All Webinars | L.A.B.S. #2

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Hello everyone. Thank you so much for joining us. Today.

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We are gonna give everyone just a

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couple of minutes to join. We're gonna aim to start

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at about two minutes after the hour, but in

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the meantime

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I am going to launch a little Poll for

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you guys curious to know.

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Which topic today that we're planning to cover. Are you

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most looking forward to?

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and all of them is not a cop-out answer you're allowed to say that but

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if there is a if there is a topic that you're most interested in hearing about

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we're curious to know.

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All right, a lot of good responses coming in.

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so far all of the above appears to be the the leading

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results, so

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If you're just joining us, we're going to give everyone until about two minutes

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after the hour. So in just under a minute or so, we'll

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get started. But for right now, if you have a second, you know,

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we're curious to know what you're interested to to learn most

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about today.

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All right. We are at two minutes after the hour.

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So if you haven't had a chance to answer the poll yet.

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You know, you can just let us know after the fact I'm gonna end

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the poll and I will share the results.

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Looks like most people are interested

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in hearing about all the topics today, but it seems

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like AI is definitely a popular topic as

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well. So

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looking forward to hearing how you guys think of these. I

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think think of these different topics afterwards.

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Okay.

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All right, so we're gonna get started.

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So hello everyone. My name

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is Sandy Hogue. I'm the business manager here at its

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and I'm going to be your host and moderator today.

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Once again, thank you so much for joining us. We've got

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a path session for you today covering three topics

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all about security technology in

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online assessment.

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So this will be a panel style webinar. So for the

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majority of the time, it'll just be me and the panelists on

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screen talking. There will be a few slides and

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videos that I'll share throughout but for the most part, it's just

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going to be an interview.

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So before we Dive In

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I just want to go over a couple of housekeeping items.

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We will be doing our best to handle Q&A at

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the end of each topic. So first we're going to cover secure browsers.

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Then we're going to cover two camera proctoring and then finally we're

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going to end with AI so we'll try to answer

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any questions pertinent to those topics while we are still in

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them. But that's of course time permitting. We're going to be keeping an

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eye on that time. So, you know, please do submit your

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questions as you think of them. There is a Q&A feature at the bottom

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that you should see and if we

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can't get to them during the topic itself. We will do

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our best to Circle back to those questions at the end, you know

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time permitting.

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This webinar will be recorded. So we will share the link to access

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this after the webinar is ended. You'll you'll get a

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follow-up email sometime today or tomorrow.

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And once the webinar is done don't click away

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to quickly because there will

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be a survey at the end that will appear in your Zoom window. So we

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would love to hear your feedback about today's webinar

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as well as suggestions for future topics. So once

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again don't click away too quickly.

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Okay, so just briefly if you are not familiar with

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its if this is the first time you're you're joining

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the webinar and you don't know who we are, we are a technology company established

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25 years ago with the vision of bringing test

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delivery online.

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So over the last 25 years, we've really been at the Forefront

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of innovation in the assessment industry working really

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closely with our partners to develop a suite of

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software and services that you know, not only

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support assessment programs but to help them evolve.

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So we're gonna Dive Right In without further

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Ado. I'm going to invite our panelists to turn on their

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cameras and mics and join us and introduce themselves.

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All right. I see Pat and Chris I get afternoon

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guys.

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Hello, Sandy.

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Pat would you like to introduce yourself? Sure. Hi, I'm

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Pat Ward. I'm the president and CEO of its.

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Great. Thanks for joining us Pat and Chris.

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I'm Chris glackin. I'm director of Innovative Technologies here

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at its.

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Awesome. Well, thank you so much for joining me today for

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this conversation. I'm really excited to get to

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ask you guys some questions today.

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So we are going to Dive Right In our first

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topic today is all about secure browsers and

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to set the stage for this

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topic and for each of the topics. What I'm going to do is share a

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brief video just again in case anyone does

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not know what a secure browser is. I'm going

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to share a brief video that covers that and then we'll

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dive right into the questions.

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All right. This does have sound so

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if you have system audio, you may want to turn that up.

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A secure

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browser is a software that restricts access on a

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device limiting the test takers access to only

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the test and approve resources while preventing

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unauthorized usage of the devices other

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features and applications.

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The goal

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of a secure browser is to ensure a Level Playing Field

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by preventing cheating while being invisible and

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seamless during a testing process without any

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noticeable impact on the test taking experience.

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The limitation of a secure browser is that it can

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only secure what is being run on the testing device and cannot

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prevent external cheating such as

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environmental factors people in the room

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or video cameras.

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All right.

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So my first question is for you Pat.

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Seems like every most companies who

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do online testing have some kind of a secure a

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lockdown browser.

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So from your perspective, are they mostly

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all the same?

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Yeah, thanks Sandy. Yeah, it's interesting because every

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test delivery vendor has a secure browser, they're

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using so it's a key part of the entire suite and the surprising

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answer is no, you know, I think if there's

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really one thing I want people to take away from this webinar. It's

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that really most secure browsers are

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well not secure. They look

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like they are they look good. They do everything you expect but

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but you can actually steal content and cheat

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relatively easily and the programs will

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never know. I think the really scary part of

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this is that most of the programs and you know,

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the companies that are creating these and the developers. They

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actually don't know how easily it is to hack them. We

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were in that boat. So I mean, I'm actually speaking as you

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know a company that actually had to deal with it. We you

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know, like every test delivery vendor we use a company

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out there to audit our security. It's a

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good one, you know, very well known very good company

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ours missed the advanced.

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Back how to advance hack sort of a secure browser

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and every audit they ever did we had

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a partner company auditus with another company and they missed

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all the Advanced Tax. What you find

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is that the Legacy secure browsers and by

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Legacy, I mean the secure browsers that I'm calling not

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secure that think they are they're depending

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on security that's like based on process detection. There's

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something called an affinity Affinity bit

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which sort of keeps people from capturing screens or change and

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focus detection and that's not nearly good enough

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these days. Hmm.

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So then Chris how hard or

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easy I guess is it for someone to cheat?

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So it's an interesting question it it's really going to depend on

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what they're what their goal is and what they're trying to do. Um,

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I think something that's really important to consider. Is

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that just because a a hack or

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an attack might be complicated. It doesn't

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mean that everybody can't do it. So all you need

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is just one person that's motivated enough that has the time and

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the energy and them and the motivation to be able to

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figure figure that out and these things can easily be packaged.

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They can be made into a program that's run as simple as

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something with a little hockey and at that point anybody can

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can run that hack. So yeah might have took

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somebody with a little bit of knowledge and determination to make it but they can

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turn around and sell these things or if they're motivated against you

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start start Distributing it so so it's important

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not to think that just because a hack is hard that

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the candidate deserves to pass a test or anything like that.

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That's not the case because they can easily just pay somebody

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for the software and we have been starting to see some

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of these hacks for sale and you'll keep seeing those kind.

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Past because hackers will they'll take the path of

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least resistance, right and they'll start they'll take one approach and then

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if you shut that approach down then they'll find another approach and so

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maybe it helps the ante a little but on those that

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you'll have that cat and mouse game that always be there and people

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these things can be packaged and made

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fairly easy to use. So just because something is hard doesn't

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mean a lot of people couldn't use it.

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Okay. All right, so Pat you

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say that not every secure browser necessarily works

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or not. They're you know,

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not necessarily all the same and Chris you're

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saying that you know, it's not definitely not impossible for

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someone to cheat. So then how important is a secure browser

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pet.

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Well, I you know just to add on to Chris's answer.

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So, you know a good secure browser one that

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actually does work can actually make it very difficult to

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cheat. So it's not impossible to stop. It's just

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that there's a lot of people who do not have the technology to

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actually do it. You know, we we can block,

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you know, most attack vectors and and by vectors,

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you know, I'm just talking about different methods that

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you can use to cheat so we can do that right but

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so then you get into your question, which is how important

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is it. Well, you know that this is that same question about how

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important is security and remote proctoring and

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things like that, but it really comes down to the program and the stakes

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that the test and I like to throw in one more thing

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because you know, we have some clients where

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you know cheating in their tests would be

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like a death penalty for a career, you know, like if you're cheating on

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a doctor's exam or something like that the these boards

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and these programs and the US family and people like that they

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take that super seriously. So in that particular case

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You know the death penalty of loan

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is enough to keep people from probably cheating because just some some

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things like that, but for a lot of programs, you know, like you

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get into an IT certification test, you know,

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nobody really cares, right? It's not really

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and I mean the program's care don't get me wrong but it's not

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going to affect the career the people hiring them

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aren't going to know they got caught at one point. It's just sort of

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a hidden unknown thing. So, you know, the question really comes

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down to is that the program level, you know, how much do

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you care and the important thing I think you know,

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I would want people to recognize is that we talk about a

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secure browser. And the reason why we bring it up the reason why we're even talking

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about it in this webinar is that it is your first and

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your most important line of defense against

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cheating and stealing content. It's not your Proctor. It's

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not your remote proctoring system. It's not your test drive or

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all those things are important. They all matter but the

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secure browser is the very first piece and if

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that piece is insecure all that stuff the proctor

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watching is not going to be what's happening anyway, so it

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doesn't really matter.

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Got it. Okay. So how important

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is it? Pretty pretty important to have

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a good one and for it to be your first line of defense.

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All right. So Chris, are you able to share with us some of

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the hacks that you're seeing?

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Yeah, so

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So this one's this one's interesting, right? Because there's a bit of that survivorship

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bias there. So you're only going to see the

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ones that you're catching. You're not gonna see the ones that you aren't catching

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right and and every day you learn something new but on there's I

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kind of see it is like three different three different

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tiers of kind of hacks that you're gonna

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experience. The the first one like the lowest level stuff is

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virtualization. So hackers are gonna try to use a virtual machine

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and if you use a virtual machine for anybody that might not know what

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that is. It's essentially it allows. It's a

252
00:13:42.600 --> 00:13:45.900
it's operating system within your own operating system. So

253
00:13:45.900 --> 00:13:48.400
what that means is if you launch a secure browser,

254
00:13:48.400 --> 00:13:51.500
it doesn't matter how good your secure browser is because you're only locking

255
00:13:51.500 --> 00:13:54.300
down this window on your computer that can be moved around

256
00:13:54.300 --> 00:13:57.100
and you're essentially no more than a web browser at that

257
00:13:57.100 --> 00:14:00.300
point. So virtual machine is just gonna get past any type

258
00:14:00.300 --> 00:14:03.200
of security there. You're going doing that. I'll be like that's like you're really

259
00:14:03.200 --> 00:14:07.000
low level hacks and and that opens up the door a lot of other possibilities.

260
00:14:06.500 --> 00:14:09.300
Um, a lot of the some of

261
00:14:09.300 --> 00:14:12.000
the main goals is for cheating is you're gonna you're

262
00:14:12.100 --> 00:14:15.500
Either from a cheating perspective is getting that proxy tester

263
00:14:15.500 --> 00:14:18.100
in there. So so to get a proxy tester in there

264
00:14:18.100 --> 00:14:21.400
is how can I get that screen share going again that this cure browser

265
00:14:21.400 --> 00:14:24.400
stop from me and how can I get remote remote access

266
00:14:24.400 --> 00:14:27.300
or secondary mouse or keyboard into the

267
00:14:27.300 --> 00:14:30.400
mix so that they could take the test for me. So you're gonna see those kind

268
00:14:30.400 --> 00:14:33.300
of Leverage and then if you start to block those things down then it

269
00:14:33.300 --> 00:14:36.700
starts to then you got like some other I would call them like tears. So

270
00:14:36.700 --> 00:14:39.900
people will start to look and manipulating and bypassing

271
00:14:39.900 --> 00:14:42.300
the secure browser. So, okay, so you so

272
00:14:42.300 --> 00:14:45.300
you shut the door on VMS. And so now they're gonna they're gonna take another

273
00:14:45.300 --> 00:14:48.200
approach and then and then you can get to the super like state level

274
00:14:48.200 --> 00:14:51.600
hackers where it's not you you can modify the

275
00:14:51.600 --> 00:14:54.200
underlying operating system and do things there too.

276
00:14:54.200 --> 00:14:57.700
So so it's all just about the determination and the

277
00:14:57.700 --> 00:15:00.900
motivation that that they have to do that but that's

278
00:15:00.900 --> 00:15:03.000
kind of how I would I would I would kind of

279
00:15:03.300 --> 00:15:04.600
group those categories there.

280
00:15:06.200 --> 00:15:09.300
Okay. Well, this is all kind of scary.

281
00:15:10.900 --> 00:15:13.200
All right, so Pat, if I am, you

282
00:15:13.200 --> 00:15:16.600
know, I'm a test sponsor. How can I find out if my secure browser

283
00:15:16.600 --> 00:15:17.200
works?

284
00:15:18.400 --> 00:15:19.300
right, so

285
00:15:20.400 --> 00:15:23.500
So, you know one of the things we do and I think you

286
00:15:23.500 --> 00:15:26.400
know a lot of programs do is is go check out YouTube

287
00:15:26.400 --> 00:15:29.200
go check out the internet and do some searches and

288
00:15:29.200 --> 00:15:32.500
see if you can buy one of those tools that that Chris is

289
00:15:32.500 --> 00:15:35.400
talking about. That's a that's a that's a nice way to sort of get a

290
00:15:35.400 --> 00:15:38.100
sense of you know, is there a way to do it you'll go

291
00:15:38.100 --> 00:15:41.300
out there and you're going to find you know people that basically say

292
00:15:41.300 --> 00:15:44.100
they can cheat with most things. Um,

293
00:15:44.100 --> 00:15:47.200
but but the other level is you have to

294
00:15:47.200 --> 00:15:50.500
build into what Chris was talking about those kind of different levels. We are

295
00:15:50.500 --> 00:15:53.700
seeing people mostly at the easy and

296
00:15:53.700 --> 00:15:56.300
medium level right now, but we

297
00:15:56.300 --> 00:15:59.500
know there's ways to do it that are sort of another level and you

298
00:15:59.500 --> 00:16:02.800
know, we're blocking attacks that are sort of one more great above

299
00:16:02.800 --> 00:16:05.100
that those things so that the way

300
00:16:05.100 --> 00:16:08.500
to find that stuff is you got to have a you know, a pen test a penetration

301
00:16:08.500 --> 00:16:11.200
test the secure audit that somebody knows what they're doing.

302
00:16:11.200 --> 00:16:14.200
The problem you have is is finding somebody

303
00:16:14.200 --> 00:16:17.100
who actually, you know knows what they're doing in that and that's going to

304
00:16:17.100 --> 00:16:19.800
be the challenge finding somebody who can actually hack things.

305
00:16:20.700 --> 00:16:21.200
Mm-hmm.

306
00:16:22.300 --> 00:16:26.200
One quick follow-up question there. You said go to YouTube. So hackers

307
00:16:25.200 --> 00:16:29.000
are posting how to do things on YouTube. Yeah, there's

308
00:16:28.400 --> 00:16:31.300
some there's actually videos of them

309
00:16:31.300 --> 00:16:34.200
doing the hacks. And you know, I'm talking

310
00:16:34.200 --> 00:16:38.500
about people that are there that are going doing and doing basically disassembling

311
00:16:37.500 --> 00:16:40.400
the code and patching the code, you

312
00:16:40.400 --> 00:16:43.500
know, so you take a program and they they put a

313
00:16:43.500 --> 00:16:46.400
jump in the code. So wherever it checked say

314
00:16:46.400 --> 00:16:49.300
for a VM, they just jump right over that code and therefore it's

315
00:16:49.300 --> 00:16:52.200
no longer checking for a VM and that's where Chris was talking about. They go

316
00:16:52.200 --> 00:16:55.400
as far as they need to then they stop because that's good enough

317
00:16:55.400 --> 00:16:58.700
now they can get past the VM so literally things

318
00:16:58.700 --> 00:17:00.200
like that you can see only YouTube.

319
00:17:01.100 --> 00:17:04.900
Wow, um, all right. So then do

320
00:17:04.900 --> 00:17:07.100
we have any pets you have a sense of

321
00:17:07.100 --> 00:17:10.300
like what percentage of people are trying to do this? Is there any

322
00:17:10.300 --> 00:17:13.500
data about this? Yeah, so that that's an

323
00:17:13.500 --> 00:17:17.500
interesting question. So first of all, it depends on the program, you know,

324
00:17:17.500 --> 00:17:20.200
every program is a little bit different on how

325
00:17:20.200 --> 00:17:23.400
they do it. We see it and and it's also different at some

326
00:17:23.400 --> 00:17:26.800
level at you know, like which countries and things like that one of

327
00:17:26.800 --> 00:17:30.200
our programs we can see in Block about 2% So

328
00:17:29.200 --> 00:17:32.800
we're seeing about 2% of the testers trying something.

329
00:17:32.800 --> 00:17:35.000
We you know, we changed our system so that we

330
00:17:35.100 --> 00:17:38.200
know it later in the game so that we're catching them after they

331
00:17:38.200 --> 00:17:41.700
sort of identify that's sort of a key point. But really the

332
00:17:41.700 --> 00:17:44.200
key thing is programs have to realize is the what

333
00:17:44.200 --> 00:17:47.600
you don't know is the ones that you aren't catching right and that's

334
00:17:47.600 --> 00:17:50.500
what was happening previously and you know, and and we

335
00:17:50.500 --> 00:17:53.300
actually think we've got it very much

336
00:17:53.300 --> 00:17:56.200
locked down now, but but you know, there was definitely a time

337
00:17:56.200 --> 00:17:59.800
we didn't and I think that's true of a lot of programs today. Mm-hmm.

338
00:18:02.300 --> 00:18:05.800
All right. So Chris, I'm curious. You know, there's been a

339
00:18:05.800 --> 00:18:08.500
lot of Buzz around chat GPT.

340
00:18:08.500 --> 00:18:11.200
This has been the Talk of the Town on the

341
00:18:11.200 --> 00:18:14.500
internet for a couple of months now so, you know

342
00:18:14.500 --> 00:18:17.900
can something like chat GPT be used

343
00:18:17.900 --> 00:18:18.700
for cheating.

344
00:18:20.500 --> 00:18:23.200
Yeah, I mean you'd be surprised at anything that could

345
00:18:23.200 --> 00:18:26.400
be used for cheating really but chat chat chat

346
00:18:26.400 --> 00:18:29.200
TPT is is one of the the flavors of the month

347
00:18:29.200 --> 00:18:32.300
right now and it is interesting. Um,

348
00:18:32.300 --> 00:18:35.400
so I'm sure everybody watching this right

349
00:18:35.400 --> 00:18:38.500
now is already aware of what chat GPT is but at a

350
00:18:38.500 --> 00:18:41.400
high level it's it's a way that you can you can

351
00:18:41.400 --> 00:18:44.500
send it a prop so you can ask it a question and we'll return to

352
00:18:44.500 --> 00:18:47.500
of a well-formed response on that that consists

353
00:18:47.500 --> 00:18:50.500
of actual data that can be like in an

354
00:18:50.500 --> 00:18:53.200
actual well response that can be used to answer a question and there's

355
00:18:53.200 --> 00:18:56.200
there's already YouTube videos and news articles and

356
00:18:56.200 --> 00:18:59.700
everything about people already using this during testing and so it's really

357
00:18:59.700 --> 00:19:02.800
interesting and so to get it like, um, so Sandy

358
00:19:02.800 --> 00:19:05.300
if you can low bring up that video that I sent you on

359
00:19:05.300 --> 00:19:08.400
that I can kind of in a visual a visual

360
00:19:08.400 --> 00:19:11.800
here about how this could be used inside of a secure

361
00:19:11.800 --> 00:19:14.400
browser. Now this is this is something that we made

362
00:19:14.400 --> 00:19:17.700
our ourselves. There's this isn't

363
00:19:17.700 --> 00:19:20.100
something that we have we saw on YouTube or anything like that, but

364
00:19:20.500 --> 00:19:23.300
What this is essentially so Chad GPT, it has

365
00:19:23.300 --> 00:19:26.300
these apis and so if you're able to get a process

366
00:19:26.300 --> 00:19:29.400
running that can go on detected by the secure browser. Well, what

367
00:19:29.400 --> 00:19:32.200
you can do here is pretty much when you get to an essay question

368
00:19:32.200 --> 00:19:35.200
in your test is what's happening right here, you'll see there's

369
00:19:35.200 --> 00:19:38.100
an essay question. And so what I'm going to do here is I'm going

370
00:19:38.100 --> 00:19:41.800
to just kind of send send a question that I want to chat GPT.

371
00:19:41.800 --> 00:19:44.600
Now, I'm inside the secure browser. This cure

372
00:19:44.600 --> 00:19:47.900
browser is no idea that I'm doing this and so I highlight my question and

373
00:19:47.900 --> 00:19:50.200
then I just I just run a quick hockey that you're not seeing

374
00:19:50.200 --> 00:19:54.100
me do on the screen. I send it off to chat GPT chat GTP

375
00:19:53.100 --> 00:19:56.400
processes and then I'm able to load it in my screen

376
00:19:56.400 --> 00:19:59.300
and so in this scenario, I'm just using the clipboard as a buffer here.

377
00:19:59.300 --> 00:20:02.400
And so it's so it's interesting right? Like this is a basic question.

378
00:20:02.400 --> 00:20:05.100
Like well, this is the sky blue. Why is this guy blue or something

379
00:20:05.100 --> 00:20:08.800
like that? But you can see that the response that comes back there. It's not

380
00:20:08.800 --> 00:20:11.500
like a Google search It's a well-form response. And

381
00:20:11.500 --> 00:20:15.000
so if you put this in the context of a more robust

382
00:20:14.300 --> 00:20:17.800
question or something you can you can get get

383
00:20:17.800 --> 00:20:20.200
a robust answer that can either serve as

384
00:20:20.500 --> 00:20:23.500
Answer as a starting point and with an attack like this, you

385
00:20:23.500 --> 00:20:26.600
can just continue to layer these things on until you have a well-formed

386
00:20:26.600 --> 00:20:29.400
essay. So so with the since with this with

387
00:20:29.400 --> 00:20:32.400
this hack, I'm not limited. Just one question. I'm just using API under the

388
00:20:32.400 --> 00:20:35.200
covers. I can keep asking it and I could put together my essay in

389
00:20:35.200 --> 00:20:38.100
real time. And so that that could allow somebody who has

390
00:20:38.100 --> 00:20:41.400
no knowledge on a subject to be able to put in a response that will

391
00:20:41.400 --> 00:20:44.300
look like they do I'm so so this is just an example of

392
00:20:44.300 --> 00:20:47.200
how you could use something like that and just all the

393
00:20:47.200 --> 00:20:48.400
different vectors that are out there.

394
00:20:49.800 --> 00:20:53.200
So then if you figure out how to hack this Chris, have

395
00:20:52.200 --> 00:20:55.100
you figured out how to prevent it? You know,

396
00:20:55.100 --> 00:20:58.200
like what? You know, how can you prevent this kind of attack?

397
00:20:59.200 --> 00:21:02.400
Yeah, so so that that's the thing, right? So, um,

398
00:21:02.400 --> 00:21:05.000
so kind of alluding back to what we said earlier. How do you

399
00:21:05.100 --> 00:21:08.300
stay on top of this stuff? Well, you can have companies do it or and you

400
00:21:08.300 --> 00:21:11.200
can or you just you want to try to get ahead of the tax before they

401
00:21:11.200 --> 00:21:14.700
become an attack, right? And so for something like this, will you

402
00:21:14.700 --> 00:21:17.600
just break it down? What is this attack doing? Well, the attack factor

403
00:21:17.600 --> 00:21:20.400
is using chat GPT, right? And

404
00:21:20.400 --> 00:21:23.500
so it's using API. So that means has to use internet to

405
00:21:23.500 --> 00:21:27.200
call out to something external and return it, right so so it

406
00:21:26.200 --> 00:21:29.000
could be it could be implemented a whole bunch of

407
00:21:29.300 --> 00:21:32.400
different ways in this scenario. There was a clipboard buffered you so so you

408
00:21:32.400 --> 00:21:35.200
can you can watch your clipboard and things like that, but that's not

409
00:21:35.200 --> 00:21:38.700
attacking the root. The other thing you do is just monitor for processes that

410
00:21:38.700 --> 00:21:42.000
are making calls out to other other domains

411
00:21:41.200 --> 00:21:44.300
that you don't want to be used. Right. So so the difference

412
00:21:44.300 --> 00:21:47.500
here is that this is a call being made outside the secure browser. So

413
00:21:47.500 --> 00:21:50.400
this is happening without the secure browsers knowledge

414
00:21:50.400 --> 00:21:53.100
because your browsers only monitoring a typical one. It's only

415
00:21:53.100 --> 00:21:56.900
gonna monitor traffic that's happening within there. And so those things so

416
00:21:56.900 --> 00:21:59.000
really you want to those are different areas that you

417
00:21:59.100 --> 00:22:01.100
Kind of key in on the Block something like that.

418
00:22:02.500 --> 00:22:06.500
Okay, Chris one more question for you. We've been

419
00:22:06.500 --> 00:22:09.200
talking about cheating so far, you know, like someone trying to

420
00:22:09.200 --> 00:22:12.400
you know circumvent the secure browser so

421
00:22:12.400 --> 00:22:13.400
that they can you know

422
00:22:14.600 --> 00:22:17.300
Cheat on their test and do better but what about

423
00:22:17.300 --> 00:22:20.500
content theft? I know that's another sort of big factor here

424
00:22:20.500 --> 00:22:21.100
a big concern.

425
00:22:22.500 --> 00:22:25.400
Yeah, it certainly is especially if

426
00:22:25.400 --> 00:22:28.000
if you have content that's valuable to people. Um,

427
00:22:28.200 --> 00:22:31.600
so there's a couple different ways you could do it one of

428
00:22:31.600 --> 00:22:34.400
the one one well-known ways through a man in the middle attack.

429
00:22:34.400 --> 00:22:37.700
And so a man in the middle attack is essentially where you insert yourself

430
00:22:37.700 --> 00:22:40.200
between the the test the testing the

431
00:22:40.200 --> 00:22:43.400
driver on the server and then the client right and so as

432
00:22:43.400 --> 00:22:46.500
a person trying to steal content before it actually makes to

433
00:22:46.500 --> 00:22:49.800
my secure browser and paints itself on the page. I'm gonna intercept that

434
00:22:49.800 --> 00:22:52.200
request and just save off all that Mark up all that

435
00:22:52.200 --> 00:22:56.000
HTML off to local file and I'll have it there if you're

436
00:22:55.200 --> 00:22:58.400
able to kind of disable the screen sharing process

437
00:22:58.400 --> 00:23:01.600
and and record your screen now, that's another way and

438
00:23:01.600 --> 00:23:04.600
then and then another way out outside of that is just

439
00:23:04.600 --> 00:23:07.300
through just something really old school that the that

440
00:23:07.300 --> 00:23:10.700
this your brows is not gonna be able to catch which is just using using a

441
00:23:10.700 --> 00:23:13.100
camera and so yeah, I think I'll send you another

442
00:23:13.100 --> 00:23:16.400
picture on this but it's really it's it's crazy

443
00:23:16.400 --> 00:23:19.400
what these cameras look like these days and so you can

444
00:23:19.400 --> 00:23:22.100
see in this slide. I mean like if you look at that button

445
00:23:22.500 --> 00:23:23.300
Right. It's like

446
00:23:24.100 --> 00:23:27.500
that's gonna be really hard for a proctor to detect on

447
00:23:27.500 --> 00:23:30.600
and there's people doing interesting things in this area to catch what

448
00:23:30.600 --> 00:23:33.400
like to catch like lens refractions and stuff. But at

449
00:23:33.400 --> 00:23:37.100
the end of the day, I mean just looking at this picture alone if that

450
00:23:36.100 --> 00:23:40.000
camera is focused on your monitor that that no secure

451
00:23:39.300 --> 00:23:41.300
browser is gonna be able to stop that.

452
00:23:42.100 --> 00:23:42.400
hmm

453
00:23:43.800 --> 00:23:46.500
Wow, that is that is ingenious

454
00:23:46.500 --> 00:23:50.400
in some ways. Um, okay so Pat

455
00:23:49.400 --> 00:23:52.300
we talked about that secure brow

456
00:23:52.300 --> 00:23:55.200
a good secure browser is necessary as your first on a defense,

457
00:23:55.200 --> 00:23:58.500
but what are some other prevention techniques that should be considered

458
00:23:58.500 --> 00:23:58.800
here?

459
00:24:00.300 --> 00:24:04.000
Right. So I think

460
00:24:03.700 --> 00:24:06.200
you know comes down to partially the

461
00:24:06.200 --> 00:24:09.400
location of the test matters, you know, when you get into a

462
00:24:09.400 --> 00:24:12.900
remote proctoring situation the examine controls

463
00:24:12.900 --> 00:24:15.300
the location that's a challenge right with

464
00:24:15.300 --> 00:24:18.400
the examine controls the location. They can start putting cameras in

465
00:24:18.400 --> 00:24:21.500
different spots and things like that that that's a real problem. So

466
00:24:21.500 --> 00:24:24.300
you're testing centers are more secure though. I will point

467
00:24:24.300 --> 00:24:27.200
out even in a testing center. You have different sort of

468
00:24:27.200 --> 00:24:30.300
levels. You have sort of your corporate own centers. They're usually

469
00:24:30.300 --> 00:24:33.300
a higher level of security and then you have your sort of

470
00:24:33.300 --> 00:24:36.200
third-party centers. The third parties centers have a

471
00:24:36.200 --> 00:24:39.300
lot of the same challenges as the you know at home because

472
00:24:39.300 --> 00:24:42.200
they those environments can potentially be hacked. So that's a

473
00:24:42.200 --> 00:24:45.100
that's a real problem. So what you're going to be seeing and if you

474
00:24:45.100 --> 00:24:48.300
go to ATP, you'll see a lot of this the real solution starts to

475
00:24:48.300 --> 00:24:51.600
become content test design. How do you actually build

476
00:24:51.600 --> 00:24:54.600
your test? How do you structure tests and items lots

477
00:24:54.600 --> 00:24:57.900
and lots of items AIG matters that's automatic

478
00:24:57.900 --> 00:25:00.200
item generation. That's the concept of actually

479
00:25:00.200 --> 00:25:03.600
Generating lots of items creating clones and using clones

480
00:25:03.600 --> 00:25:06.200
things like that it also matters when you

481
00:25:06.200 --> 00:25:09.100
get into things like remote proctoring. So

482
00:25:09.100 --> 00:25:12.200
the technology used in the remote proctoring matters. We're going

483
00:25:12.200 --> 00:25:15.200
to talk maybe a little bit about this later with the AI thing while so

484
00:25:15.200 --> 00:25:19.000
talk about keyboards and mouse mice detection and things like that the

485
00:25:18.200 --> 00:25:21.300
remote Proctor training matters, right you're talking about,

486
00:25:21.300 --> 00:25:24.300
you know, is it a is it a person making six or seven

487
00:25:24.300 --> 00:25:27.600
dollars an hour somewhere or three dollars an hour or is it

488
00:25:27.600 --> 00:25:30.200
somebody who's a little bit more professional so that can make

489
00:25:30.200 --> 00:25:33.500
a big difference and then last is the post test analysis detecting it

490
00:25:33.500 --> 00:25:36.600
you can do some things to find, you know are people

491
00:25:36.600 --> 00:25:39.800
navigating quickly. Are they looking at their exhibits and

492
00:25:39.800 --> 00:25:42.300
things like that? Do they look at all the aspects of the

493
00:25:42.300 --> 00:25:45.300
question do they scroll the question do they just answer it so you

494
00:25:45.300 --> 00:25:48.400
can use things like that to kind of tell whether or

495
00:25:48.400 --> 00:25:50.200
not you have cheating going on. Hmm?

496
00:25:51.400 --> 00:25:55.000
All right. So final question in this area. What should

497
00:25:54.200 --> 00:25:58.000
a program do then? What's your advice? Yeah. So

498
00:25:57.600 --> 00:26:00.500
the big thing is you have to decide you

499
00:26:00.500 --> 00:26:03.500
know, how important it is to you. What's the possibility of

500
00:26:03.500 --> 00:26:06.100
somebody cheating and stealing content? How much do you

501
00:26:06.100 --> 00:26:09.500
care and what you're willing to do to prevent it because the

502
00:26:09.500 --> 00:26:12.500
prevention costs money or it costs. Well, you

503
00:26:12.500 --> 00:26:15.500
know flexibility like do you turn off remote proctoring the

504
00:26:15.500 --> 00:26:18.400
answer is most people don't want to go down to that level but there

505
00:26:18.400 --> 00:26:21.300
are some programs for instance that our Center based only.

506
00:26:23.300 --> 00:26:27.700
Okay, perfect asked you have to adjust invest

507
00:26:26.700 --> 00:26:29.900
in the you know your partners for the security invest

508
00:26:29.900 --> 00:26:32.800
in the content design things like that. Mm-hmm.

509
00:26:34.200 --> 00:26:35.500
Right, that's great advice.

510
00:26:36.400 --> 00:26:39.200
I don't have any questions in the Q&A right now.

511
00:26:39.200 --> 00:26:42.600
So if anyone thinks of additional questions that you have about secure

512
00:26:42.600 --> 00:26:45.000
browser, you know pop them in later and then we'll get to them

513
00:26:45.600 --> 00:26:48.300
at the end of the at the end of the webinar.

514
00:26:49.800 --> 00:26:52.900
We're going to shift gears and switch over to two

515
00:26:52.900 --> 00:26:53.800
camera proctoring.

516
00:26:54.400 --> 00:26:57.300
Just like the last time I am going to share a

517
00:26:57.300 --> 00:26:57.800
video with you.

518
00:27:01.200 --> 00:27:01.700
All right.

519
00:27:03.200 --> 00:27:04.200
See the lines up.

520
00:27:11.400 --> 00:27:14.600
Two camera proctoring is a type of remote proctoring where

521
00:27:14.600 --> 00:27:17.500
a mobile device is used for an additional Viewpoint of

522
00:27:17.500 --> 00:27:20.600
the testing environment providing increased security

523
00:27:20.600 --> 00:27:23.500
by capturing views that are not visible just one

524
00:27:23.500 --> 00:27:23.900
camera.

525
00:27:26.100 --> 00:27:31.100
In two

526
00:27:30.100 --> 00:27:33.500
camera proctoring a mobile devices

527
00:27:33.500 --> 00:27:36.400
secured using its native apis to

528
00:27:36.400 --> 00:27:39.400
restrict access and lock down its functionalities.

529
00:27:40.200 --> 00:27:43.200
During this time, no calls or messages can be

530
00:27:43.200 --> 00:27:44.500
sent or received.

531
00:27:51.100 --> 00:27:54.300
Access to the entire mobile device is not giving during the

532
00:27:54.300 --> 00:27:56.100
two camera proctoring process.

533
00:27:56.900 --> 00:27:59.200
The mobile device is only used as a

534
00:27:59.200 --> 00:28:00.200
secondary camera.

535
00:28:01.200 --> 00:28:03.700
No personal or private information is viewed.

536
00:28:10.100 --> 00:28:13.400
During two camera proctoring the Proctor can

537
00:28:13.400 --> 00:28:16.500
simultaneously view both video streams and zoom in

538
00:28:16.500 --> 00:28:19.100
on a video for a better view of the testing environment.

539
00:28:20.200 --> 00:28:23.700
The Proctor will only use audio from one of the cameras video

540
00:28:23.700 --> 00:28:24.200
streams.

541
00:28:29.600 --> 00:28:29.900
right

542
00:28:31.900 --> 00:28:33.800
So Pat, my first question is for you.

543
00:28:34.900 --> 00:28:37.300
When should a program consider using

544
00:28:37.300 --> 00:28:38.600
a two camera solution?

545
00:28:40.300 --> 00:28:43.200
Yeah, so, um, you know first I want to paint that

546
00:28:43.200 --> 00:28:46.000
visual, you know, you're you're the test taker and you've got

547
00:28:46.300 --> 00:28:49.200
your camera like we all have here and then you've got this

548
00:28:49.200 --> 00:28:52.000
phone propped up on something maybe a book, you know,

549
00:28:52.300 --> 00:28:55.100
put, you know pointing and showing your keyboard, you know, so it's

550
00:28:55.100 --> 00:28:58.300
it's basically showing a different angle for the

551
00:28:58.300 --> 00:29:01.200
Proctor where they can see sort of your hands. Maybe your

552
00:29:01.200 --> 00:29:04.500
lap maybe your screen to some degree depends

553
00:29:04.500 --> 00:29:07.800
on the program because they they have different roles. So when when

554
00:29:07.800 --> 00:29:10.300
this concept came out and there are there are

555
00:29:10.300 --> 00:29:13.300
some companies that are really pushing it and there's some companies that are avoiding talking

556
00:29:13.300 --> 00:29:16.600
about it. But when this concept came out I can tell you where Chris

557
00:29:16.600 --> 00:29:19.200
and I were we were against it we thought it was kind

558
00:29:19.200 --> 00:29:22.200
of stupid. In fact, we thought it was a marketing thing. It was

559
00:29:22.200 --> 00:29:25.000
strictly a marketing thing and then we started kind of

560
00:29:25.300 --> 00:29:28.200
getting into this secure browser stuff and the more we hack the

561
00:29:28.200 --> 00:29:31.200
secure browser the more we kind of like the idea that we

562
00:29:31.200 --> 00:29:34.100
had just another wall in our our wall of

563
00:29:34.100 --> 00:29:37.200
prevention right if you think about security is layers, you know,

564
00:29:37.200 --> 00:29:39.900
this is another layer and you know,

565
00:29:40.200 --> 00:29:43.200
We we've kind of completely flipped on this

566
00:29:43.200 --> 00:29:46.000
and we flipped during the middle of you know,

567
00:29:46.400 --> 00:29:49.300
early middle part of 2022 at which point we decided

568
00:29:49.300 --> 00:29:52.200
to sort of make a big investment in it and add to camera to

569
00:29:52.200 --> 00:29:55.000
our systems but there's a lot of companies out there. So this is

570
00:29:55.300 --> 00:29:58.200
not like hey its invented to camera or something. There's there's a

571
00:29:58.200 --> 00:30:01.600
lot of good Solutions out there. We'll talk about some of the technical challenges

572
00:30:01.600 --> 00:30:04.300
and things like that. But but the bottom line is

573
00:30:04.300 --> 00:30:07.500
that after secure browsers we decided that line was

574
00:30:07.500 --> 00:30:10.200
important and then if security is important to you

575
00:30:10.200 --> 00:30:13.600
and deterrence is important to you and deterrence is

576
00:30:13.600 --> 00:30:16.600
kind of this concept. It's a little different which is hey every time

577
00:30:16.600 --> 00:30:20.200
you make it a little harder to cheat like for instance that BM

578
00:30:19.200 --> 00:30:23.200
person might be a little worried that that that's bm's

579
00:30:22.200 --> 00:30:25.500
gonna show up on the screen, right or if you're hacking

580
00:30:25.500 --> 00:30:28.100
it and starting something into the screen. We can actually insert a

581
00:30:28.100 --> 00:30:31.300
browser into your test. You know, that kind of can scare

582
00:30:31.300 --> 00:30:34.700
people so that deterrence is kind of nice and we recommend

583
00:30:34.700 --> 00:30:37.000
two cameras for any company that that you know

584
00:30:37.500 --> 00:30:39.700
is basically starting to get down to prop.

585
00:30:40.200 --> 00:30:42.900
You know remote proctoring. It's a it's a nice solution.

586
00:30:43.800 --> 00:30:46.300
To really your answer is anyone who was going down the route

587
00:30:46.300 --> 00:30:49.400
of remote proctoring should consider using it. Yeah, and that's

588
00:30:49.400 --> 00:30:52.100
a massive shift for me. I was completely I was

589
00:30:52.100 --> 00:30:55.400
thinking it was kind of stupid and and you know, there's some cost involved for

590
00:30:55.400 --> 00:30:58.200
all of us. So right but I don't you know,

591
00:30:58.200 --> 00:31:01.400
there it does have a you know, it's not as important in

592
00:31:01.400 --> 00:31:05.200
the in the list as say the the secure

593
00:31:04.200 --> 00:31:07.400
browser for instance. It's somewhere down farther, but

594
00:31:07.400 --> 00:31:11.000
it does add a level of security and it's useful. Mm-hmm. Well,

595
00:31:10.100 --> 00:31:13.600
thanks for sharing your your the the

596
00:31:13.600 --> 00:31:16.100
mental shift that you guys went under too. I think

597
00:31:16.100 --> 00:31:19.300
that's helpful for people to know. Hopefully Chris agreed, you

598
00:31:19.300 --> 00:31:23.300
know? Yes, we'll find out so Chris.

599
00:31:22.300 --> 00:31:26.200
Can you tell us a little bit about the technical challenges

600
00:31:25.200 --> 00:31:28.200
of the two camera solution?

601
00:31:28.900 --> 00:31:31.200
Yeah, so it was it was really

602
00:31:31.200 --> 00:31:34.800
interesting as we dove into that project. Don't really the biggest technical

603
00:31:34.800 --> 00:31:37.500
challenge. We had was just there was

604
00:31:37.500 --> 00:31:40.300
two cameras now. So how you keep that together,

605
00:31:40.300 --> 00:31:43.300
right? You're now dealing with two individual camera feeds

606
00:31:43.300 --> 00:31:46.200
and so what we wanted to do was we wanted to make sure that

607
00:31:46.200 --> 00:31:49.200
we put together a product that made those

608
00:31:49.200 --> 00:31:52.300
made those videos consumable not only in real time, but

609
00:31:52.300 --> 00:31:55.300
also give you the ability to rewind live and

610
00:31:55.300 --> 00:31:58.600
also look at these historically because if you have two videos and they

611
00:31:58.600 --> 00:32:01.300
don't think up that's gonna be really hard to go back and

612
00:32:01.300 --> 00:32:04.700
review something that you want to review and then and then you then

613
00:32:04.700 --> 00:32:07.300
it's like, okay. Well keeping something in sync it that's

614
00:32:07.300 --> 00:32:10.300
easy to do if they're both start at the same time or they both know

615
00:32:10.300 --> 00:32:13.200
the same time and nothing ever stops, but that's not the real world.

616
00:32:13.200 --> 00:32:16.200
You're gonna experience technical challenge, you know, you're at the

617
00:32:16.200 --> 00:32:19.000
experience things like phone batteries and and that kind of

618
00:32:19.200 --> 00:32:22.400
stuff and and network connections anything that might interrupt that stream that's

619
00:32:22.400 --> 00:32:25.600
really gonna throw you out of whack immediately. So the biggest thing

620
00:32:25.600 --> 00:32:28.200
the biggest the biggest thing that we wanted to

621
00:32:28.200 --> 00:32:28.700
focus on there.

622
00:32:28.800 --> 00:32:31.300
Just making sure that the solution that we ended

623
00:32:31.300 --> 00:32:34.200
up with had the ability to have two sinks. I

624
00:32:34.200 --> 00:32:37.600
could two streams. I could easily be reviewed together and keep

625
00:32:37.600 --> 00:32:40.100
them in sync. Mm-hmm, and you probably

626
00:32:40.100 --> 00:32:43.000
have to have your your sort of fail safe sort of

627
00:32:43.100 --> 00:32:46.200
just you had to make decisions. I'm sure about you know,

628
00:32:46.200 --> 00:32:49.400
what happens when the phone battery gets low. Like what do you do? Right?

629
00:32:49.400 --> 00:32:52.600
Yeah. Yeah. So those are things that we wanted to

630
00:32:52.600 --> 00:32:55.200
consider. So we make sure that you start out with the

631
00:32:55.200 --> 00:32:58.100
minimum power a minimum level of power and if you

632
00:32:58.100 --> 00:33:01.300
don't to make sure you have a power source plugged in and on the

633
00:33:01.300 --> 00:33:04.000
other side of the spectrum was just like, okay. Well, how can

634
00:33:04.100 --> 00:33:07.600
I make this consumable to the Proctor? Right? Because the Proctor already

635
00:33:07.600 --> 00:33:10.500
has a certain number of days on the screen. Are you just going to double that

636
00:33:10.500 --> 00:33:13.300
in size now be really hard to watch? So so you

637
00:33:13.300 --> 00:33:16.400
want to make sure that a proctor is viewing these in the context and

638
00:33:16.400 --> 00:33:20.200
especially for if you're not using professional Proctors

639
00:33:19.200 --> 00:33:22.200
in relying on something or you want to make these things

640
00:33:22.200 --> 00:33:25.300
he's able easy to understand and know what video goes where

641
00:33:25.300 --> 00:33:28.400
because these are separate videos, right? The person's face isn't

642
00:33:28.400 --> 00:33:28.700
in both.

643
00:33:28.800 --> 00:33:31.600
I'm you're gonna see either a set of hands are Monitor and

644
00:33:31.600 --> 00:33:34.500
a face. And so you want to make sure that you're keeping those those things

645
00:33:34.500 --> 00:33:37.400
in context together that you know, this stream goes with this

646
00:33:37.400 --> 00:33:40.300
and those type of things. And so just looking looking at it from

647
00:33:40.300 --> 00:33:43.600
a usability perspective too. Mm-hmm. I would throw

648
00:33:43.600 --> 00:33:47.100
performance into that answer too. So, you know, when

649
00:33:46.100 --> 00:33:49.100
you're you're dealing with this, you've got

650
00:33:49.100 --> 00:33:52.600
two camera feeds coming up, you know, that's that's like double the

651
00:33:52.600 --> 00:33:55.400
bandwidth. I mean, it's already a lot of data coming up and you're

652
00:33:55.400 --> 00:33:58.200
upload speeds or slower than your download speeds anyway,

653
00:33:58.200 --> 00:34:01.700
so, you know, we were quite worried about you know, all this

654
00:34:01.700 --> 00:34:04.700
data just all the sudden we doubled basically our

655
00:34:04.700 --> 00:34:07.200
data going out from each candidate which means the

656
00:34:07.200 --> 00:34:11.000
candidate you know, why I'm matters and and the coming

657
00:34:10.200 --> 00:34:13.200
into the Proctor both of those were kind

658
00:34:13.200 --> 00:34:16.300
of a challenge you had to think about and on the on the candidate

659
00:34:16.300 --> 00:34:19.400
side, you know, one of the things you have to do is make sure you have an

660
00:34:19.400 --> 00:34:22.500
absolute good way of sort of stepping down and and handling

661
00:34:22.500 --> 00:34:25.300
sort of these different sizes so that you can go down go down

662
00:34:25.300 --> 00:34:28.100
and resolution and keep making it work but maintain sort of

663
00:34:28.100 --> 00:34:28.500
whatever you

664
00:34:28.800 --> 00:34:31.200
The year minimal right minimum that you

665
00:34:31.200 --> 00:34:34.300
have to have to go do it which then starts to get into things. Like

666
00:34:34.300 --> 00:34:37.400
well, do they have a way to check it out ahead of time and how

667
00:34:37.400 --> 00:34:40.100
much can they prove out that it works so they don't get into the middle

668
00:34:40.100 --> 00:34:43.600
of the test and fail. So a lot of things related to Performance. We're

669
00:34:43.600 --> 00:34:45.200
in that those conversations as well.

670
00:34:46.500 --> 00:34:49.700
Yeah, it sounds like there's a lot to think about Chris. You

671
00:34:49.700 --> 00:34:52.500
mentioned the video feeds and trying to keep those in sync.

672
00:34:52.500 --> 00:34:53.900
What about the audio?

673
00:34:55.700 --> 00:34:59.100
So so audio is interesting. Um, I I'm

674
00:34:58.100 --> 00:35:01.100
not gonna I can't say what other companies are doing,

675
00:35:01.100 --> 00:35:04.000
but I can I can speak to what we did and the the path that

676
00:35:04.200 --> 00:35:07.500
we went down was we ended up using the just just

677
00:35:07.500 --> 00:35:10.100
a single audio source that that were capturing the same

678
00:35:10.100 --> 00:35:14.000
device that were capturing the primary video on we we

679
00:35:13.500 --> 00:35:16.400
were finding in our initial testing that

680
00:35:16.400 --> 00:35:19.700
the two two audio feeds both in a playback

681
00:35:19.700 --> 00:35:22.200
setting would require the user to

682
00:35:22.200 --> 00:35:25.500
manually mute one of them or or you'd have to automate that

683
00:35:25.500 --> 00:35:28.100
for them and then they're both typically they should be

684
00:35:28.100 --> 00:35:31.200
close to each other and so lesser in some kind of failback scenario where

685
00:35:31.200 --> 00:35:34.600
you need one. It really was just introducing an

686
00:35:34.600 --> 00:35:37.500
echo and making things harder to follow. So so we just

687
00:35:37.500 --> 00:35:41.200
we just went down the path of using the primary one. Mm-hmm. Okay,

688
00:35:40.200 --> 00:35:42.000
that makes sense.

689
00:35:43.200 --> 00:35:46.900
So Pat Chris mentioned some of the technical challenges, what about

690
00:35:46.900 --> 00:35:49.400
operational challenges, you know for both the

691
00:35:49.400 --> 00:35:52.300
candidate and the vendor. Yeah, so it does

692
00:35:52.300 --> 00:35:55.000
for the candidate, you know,

693
00:35:55.300 --> 00:35:58.600
it it means the candidate needs to have a second

694
00:35:58.600 --> 00:36:01.100
camera. Right? So, you know

695
00:36:01.100 --> 00:36:04.100
back in the day in the early days of remote proctoring, of course,

696
00:36:04.100 --> 00:36:07.200
the primary camera was a challenge for some people

697
00:36:07.200 --> 00:36:10.100
but that that went away when we all started working from home, but now

698
00:36:10.100 --> 00:36:13.000
you you've got into the second camera. We're lucky in a way

699
00:36:13.100 --> 00:36:16.700
because we're also in a world where almost everybody has a cell phone or a

700
00:36:16.700 --> 00:36:19.300
tablet or something. So but in

701
00:36:19.300 --> 00:36:22.800
our world you need to have one that's supported right because we're

702
00:36:22.800 --> 00:36:25.300
not just using it we have

703
00:36:25.300 --> 00:36:28.400
to actually control it and lock it down. So we support, you know

704
00:36:28.400 --> 00:36:31.200
iPhones Android things like that, but you're gonna have

705
00:36:31.200 --> 00:36:34.300
to use one that's a supportive one. So so right there you have some

706
00:36:34.300 --> 00:36:37.900
limitations and new additional requirements on a

707
00:36:37.900 --> 00:36:40.700
candidate and then just dealing with this extra device.

708
00:36:40.700 --> 00:36:42.800
You need to really focus.

709
00:36:43.100 --> 00:36:46.800
Sure, it's user-friendly to connect it and use it to to

710
00:36:46.800 --> 00:36:49.300
support it making sure you help

711
00:36:49.300 --> 00:36:52.600
them talk them through the process of putting it in the right spot making

712
00:36:52.600 --> 00:36:55.500
sure that it's plugged in and giving them good feedback. So the

713
00:36:55.500 --> 00:36:58.600
user interface in the flow of a system like this actually is

714
00:36:58.600 --> 00:37:01.500
more complicated, right it takes a lot more modeling and

715
00:37:01.500 --> 00:37:05.500
thinking through not not as much technology problems

716
00:37:04.500 --> 00:37:08.000
is as just sort of operationally thinking

717
00:37:07.300 --> 00:37:10.100
how the whole thing works and then on the

718
00:37:10.100 --> 00:37:13.400
vendor side, you know the program and the

719
00:37:13.400 --> 00:37:16.400
vendor and and we we kind of look at them a little bit separately because

720
00:37:16.400 --> 00:37:19.800
you know, we want to do certain things on the vendors as a supplier,

721
00:37:19.800 --> 00:37:22.300
but we need to give the programs, you know the ability

722
00:37:22.300 --> 00:37:25.900
to configure it. You know what happens if a camera disconnects, right?

723
00:37:25.900 --> 00:37:28.500
Do you kick them out? Some programs

724
00:37:28.500 --> 00:37:31.400
do some programs are not you know, we have a lot of programs the

725
00:37:31.400 --> 00:37:34.200
second the second camera if it disconnects in the middle, they're

726
00:37:34.200 --> 00:37:37.300
gonna let them keep going but that's actually something a program has to

727
00:37:37.300 --> 00:37:40.200
decide at some level so and there's

728
00:37:40.200 --> 00:37:43.100
different types of disconnects, right? You know, there's like what at

729
00:37:43.200 --> 00:37:47.100
Was just not showing or what if a completely disconnects. So so

730
00:37:46.100 --> 00:37:49.600
you have to deal with some of those things and then

731
00:37:49.600 --> 00:37:53.100
you have the cost right? You have your costs at the server

732
00:37:52.100 --> 00:37:55.800
side. It's basically doubling sort

733
00:37:55.800 --> 00:37:58.400
of your video feeds. So you've got cost of servers

734
00:37:58.400 --> 00:38:02.000
you have storage costs. You have Network costs all

735
00:38:01.100 --> 00:38:04.300
that has to be factored into like how you're dealing

736
00:38:04.300 --> 00:38:06.100
with it at a pricing level. Hmm.

737
00:38:08.600 --> 00:38:09.600
a lot of things to think about

738
00:38:11.800 --> 00:38:13.100
All right, so Chris.

739
00:38:14.200 --> 00:38:17.100
You know doesn't adding a phone in phone or tablet or

740
00:38:17.100 --> 00:38:20.400
whatever into the mix add sort of another layer of security

741
00:38:20.400 --> 00:38:23.700
challenges like couldn't I receive messages or potentially

742
00:38:23.700 --> 00:38:25.500
access other apps? How does that work?

743
00:38:26.500 --> 00:38:29.200
Yeah, so so you want to lock down that device too? So

744
00:38:29.200 --> 00:38:32.200
it is another it's another device that is

745
00:38:32.200 --> 00:38:35.300
access to the internet. In fact, the internet's requirement in order

746
00:38:35.300 --> 00:38:38.200
to use it. So what we want to do is on what

747
00:38:38.200 --> 00:38:41.800
pal is saying with supportive devices is um, we we support IOS

748
00:38:41.800 --> 00:38:44.200
and Android and we lock those apps down to make

749
00:38:44.200 --> 00:38:48.200
sure that you can't get a message during the test because just

750
00:38:47.200 --> 00:38:50.200
like we're seeing on the screen right now. You don't know

751
00:38:50.200 --> 00:38:53.400
what I'm looking at right now. You can see me and this is what a

752
00:38:53.400 --> 00:38:56.300
proctor would see. So on my phone you want to make sure that they're not

753
00:38:56.300 --> 00:38:59.200
getting a message from their friend every five minutes with some kind

754
00:38:59.200 --> 00:39:03.000
of information or something. You want to lock that down and prevent any notifications

755
00:39:02.300 --> 00:39:05.100
and also prevent that um

756
00:39:05.100 --> 00:39:08.100
prevent any distractions too just so that they can focus

757
00:39:08.100 --> 00:39:11.500
on their test. So so we do lock those secondary devices down.

758
00:39:11.500 --> 00:39:12.500
Mm-hmm.

759
00:39:13.800 --> 00:39:16.600
Okay, and is you know Chris final question

760
00:39:16.600 --> 00:39:19.200
for you? Was there anything else that you needed

761
00:39:19.200 --> 00:39:19.900
to think about here?

762
00:39:22.500 --> 00:39:25.100
Um, I mean Pat pack covered a good part that

763
00:39:25.100 --> 00:39:28.200
I that I kind of glossed over there earlier. There's a there's a

764
00:39:28.200 --> 00:39:31.600
it was a very interesting project but at the

765
00:39:31.600 --> 00:39:34.300
end of it so so it's it's always a balance between security and

766
00:39:34.300 --> 00:39:37.100
usability. So you are introducing another failure point to the

767
00:39:37.100 --> 00:39:40.300
process it having another device is another thing

768
00:39:40.300 --> 00:39:43.600
that could either not connect or something else that could go wrong, but it

769
00:39:43.600 --> 00:39:46.800
does the the benefits of it. Um, as as

770
00:39:46.800 --> 00:39:49.500
we came to find out we're we really felt

771
00:39:49.500 --> 00:39:52.500
that there was a good reason to have this in

772
00:39:52.500 --> 00:39:55.500
the mix because there are just having that other view

773
00:39:55.500 --> 00:39:58.600
if you're able to get around that first layer the of

774
00:39:58.600 --> 00:40:01.600
that important layer of the secure browser to be able to get around that that second

775
00:40:01.600 --> 00:40:04.200
camera is going to come in and help you identify those things. It's gonna

776
00:40:04.200 --> 00:40:07.200
help you see if they have anything that that this you right

777
00:40:07.200 --> 00:40:10.200
here that's giving you is not going to have so um, we did

778
00:40:10.200 --> 00:40:13.300
we do we do at the end of the day think

779
00:40:13.300 --> 00:40:14.300
there's value in having this

780
00:40:15.000 --> 00:40:15.200
Okay.

781
00:40:16.800 --> 00:40:20.100
All right Pat final question here philosophical question

782
00:40:20.100 --> 00:40:23.300
if you will so if two cameras are better

783
00:40:23.300 --> 00:40:26.100
than one are three cameras better than

784
00:40:26.100 --> 00:40:29.300
two are four better than three. You know, where does where does

785
00:40:29.300 --> 00:40:32.000
the madness end here? What's where's The Sweet Spot? You know,

786
00:40:32.300 --> 00:40:35.600
I had I have a friend who's a another test delivery

787
00:40:35.600 --> 00:40:38.500
vendor works for them. And we were we were

788
00:40:38.500 --> 00:40:41.700
chatting early very early in the process about you

789
00:40:41.700 --> 00:40:44.300
know, is two camera worth it. We were just sort of debating it because it's

790
00:40:44.300 --> 00:40:47.300
a it's a really good question. Right and there's different. It's

791
00:40:47.300 --> 00:40:50.300
a very diverse opinion set on this and this is his

792
00:40:50.300 --> 00:40:53.000
favorite question, you know, just like, you know, let me

793
00:40:53.300 --> 00:40:56.400
I'm gonna shoot you down because this, you know, look two cameras,

794
00:40:56.400 --> 00:40:59.900
you know way let's stop at three and he has a favorite joke about razors where

795
00:40:59.900 --> 00:41:02.500
dick did something like, you know, we're gonna go to Five raisers,

796
00:41:02.500 --> 00:41:05.700
but the the reality is that going

797
00:41:05.700 --> 00:41:08.500
to more than two the benefits start to

798
00:41:08.500 --> 00:41:11.000
become almost unobservable there still is

799
00:41:11.100 --> 00:41:14.400
that are benefits, but when you start throwing in the pain of

800
00:41:14.400 --> 00:41:16.500
dealing with three cameras and the reality of it

801
00:41:17.200 --> 00:41:20.300
Um, you know, it's not practical and it's just not worth it from

802
00:41:20.300 --> 00:41:24.200
a security perspective. So no, I don't think it's a really

803
00:41:23.200 --> 00:41:26.100
worth and better if you

804
00:41:26.100 --> 00:41:29.400
define better in the big picture, it's not better than two

805
00:41:29.400 --> 00:41:32.100
I think too is really a very nice practical spot. I think

806
00:41:32.100 --> 00:41:35.600
one is fine too, you know, but it all in

807
00:41:35.600 --> 00:41:38.100
all if security really matters I do recommend too.

808
00:41:38.700 --> 00:41:39.000
Okay.

809
00:41:39.900 --> 00:41:43.100
All right. Well, thank you so much. That was my last

810
00:41:42.100 --> 00:41:45.400
question for this particular topic and

811
00:41:45.400 --> 00:41:48.200
I don't see any questions in the Q&A pertaining to

812
00:41:48.200 --> 00:41:51.200
to camera. But if there are additional questions, we should

813
00:41:51.200 --> 00:41:53.300
have a few minutes at the end to Circle back to that.

814
00:41:54.200 --> 00:41:57.400
So we're going to shift right into our final topic for today

815
00:41:57.400 --> 00:42:00.400
talking about AI as with the

816
00:42:00.400 --> 00:42:03.100
last two topics. I'll share a short video and then we'll

817
00:42:03.900 --> 00:42:05.100
jump into the questions

818
00:42:06.700 --> 00:42:17.200
AI can

819
00:42:17.200 --> 00:42:20.900
help detect unexpected audio levels unpermitted people

820
00:42:20.900 --> 00:42:23.400
or items in the room or candidates looking

821
00:42:23.400 --> 00:42:24.300
away from the camera.

822
00:42:25.400 --> 00:42:28.100
However, AI should not be the sole decision

823
00:42:28.100 --> 00:42:31.900
maker, but instead be used to support the Proctor's decision-making

824
00:42:31.900 --> 00:42:32.400
process.

825
00:42:34.600 --> 00:42:40.200
AI can

826
00:42:40.200 --> 00:42:41.800
help with proctoring in two ways

827
00:42:42.500 --> 00:42:45.800
live proctoring with AI assisted monitoring that

828
00:42:45.800 --> 00:42:48.500
flag suspicious behavior for the Proctor to review

829
00:42:48.500 --> 00:42:50.600
in real time by highlighting the candidate.

830
00:42:51.300 --> 00:42:54.700
And record and review where AI identifies potential

831
00:42:54.700 --> 00:42:57.000
issues related review by the proctor.

832
00:43:00.900 --> 00:43:01.300
All right.

833
00:43:02.600 --> 00:43:05.500
So Pat, let's Jump Right In, you know, can you

834
00:43:05.500 --> 00:43:09.000
tell us a little bit about the legal restrictions for

835
00:43:08.300 --> 00:43:12.100
using AI we're talking, you know, privacy concerns

836
00:43:11.100 --> 00:43:14.400
any kind of again legal concerns security.

837
00:43:15.800 --> 00:43:18.900
What are the restrictions and maybe even moral concerns?

838
00:43:18.900 --> 00:43:21.700
I think yeah, so, you know AI

839
00:43:21.700 --> 00:43:26.000
has a sort of well-earned bad

840
00:43:24.700 --> 00:43:28.000
reputation and in

841
00:43:27.300 --> 00:43:30.400
this area and it's a real issue.

842
00:43:30.400 --> 00:43:34.000
So skin tones affected I shapes affected.

843
00:43:33.100 --> 00:43:36.300
If you have an accessibility problem, like

844
00:43:36.300 --> 00:43:39.100
head tics and something like that. These are

845
00:43:39.100 --> 00:43:42.400
all things that can trigger an AI thing

846
00:43:42.400 --> 00:43:45.200
and create a problem. So, you know, we're

847
00:43:45.200 --> 00:43:48.400
kind of aware of that right? That's that's not something and not

848
00:43:48.400 --> 00:43:51.600
only are we aware of it, but there are actually laws that say you

849
00:43:51.600 --> 00:43:55.300
can't use AI to make decisions that would

850
00:43:54.300 --> 00:43:57.200
create, you know, sort of unfairness and things like that

851
00:43:57.200 --> 00:44:00.700
so from and I think morally that's

852
00:44:00.700 --> 00:44:03.200
absolutely you know, I'm a big believer in that

853
00:44:03.200 --> 00:44:06.700
so a supporter. I know I don't think this is a bad law either. It's this

854
00:44:06.700 --> 00:44:09.500
is the right thing. Um, so from our perspective

855
00:44:09.500 --> 00:44:12.300
the key point that we we follow is that we don't

856
00:44:12.300 --> 00:44:15.700
use AI.

857
00:44:15.700 --> 00:44:18.400
The computer to make decisions from a from a

858
00:44:18.400 --> 00:44:21.700
remote proctoring perspective. We want the remote Proctor

859
00:44:21.700 --> 00:44:24.400
to make all the decisions and we

860
00:44:24.400 --> 00:44:27.800
want to make sure that our focus is on how

861
00:44:27.800 --> 00:44:30.300
to help the Proctor, you know, which is

862
00:44:30.300 --> 00:44:33.600
why we call it Proctor assist but not try to make the decisions that

863
00:44:33.600 --> 00:44:36.100
you know are what that's a system

864
00:44:36.100 --> 00:44:39.500
can do. So, you know from our our perspective, you know, the bottom line, you know,

865
00:44:39.500 --> 00:44:42.400
every decision that's going to be made in an its

866
00:44:42.400 --> 00:44:45.400
solution is going to be made by a human. So that's sort of where we land on

867
00:44:45.400 --> 00:44:47.000
that subject. Mm-hmm.

868
00:44:47.500 --> 00:44:50.100
Yeah, definitely a lot of a lot of things to be thinking

869
00:44:50.100 --> 00:44:50.400
about there.

870
00:44:51.700 --> 00:44:54.300
So Chris, what how would you characterize the

871
00:44:54.300 --> 00:44:57.400
main benefit of using AI in remote proctoring? Where

872
00:44:57.400 --> 00:44:58.100
do you see the benefits?

873
00:44:59.500 --> 00:45:02.200
So I would I see the benefits it has

874
00:45:02.200 --> 00:45:05.700
the ability to increase the efficiency of a proctor if I'm

875
00:45:05.700 --> 00:45:08.500
a proctor and I'm monitoring six to six to

876
00:45:08.500 --> 00:45:12.900
ten four to ten four to six candidates on my screen it it's

877
00:45:12.900 --> 00:45:15.200
going to help me draw. It's going to help call out

878
00:45:15.200 --> 00:45:18.400
some things that should draw my attention to a particular candidate or

879
00:45:18.400 --> 00:45:21.400
set of candidates versus another set. And so that way I'm able

880
00:45:21.400 --> 00:45:24.300
to use that that limited amount of focus that I have in that type

881
00:45:24.300 --> 00:45:27.300
of setting better to focus on the areas where like, hey

882
00:45:27.300 --> 00:45:30.400
we the system thinks there's something going on over here. Let

883
00:45:30.400 --> 00:45:33.400
me go look at it. Now again, like Pat said it's not making a decision

884
00:45:33.400 --> 00:45:36.300
for me, but it's giving me tools to help me know to go

885
00:45:36.300 --> 00:45:40.300
look at something or go back and look at something. Mm-hmm. All

886
00:45:39.300 --> 00:45:42.300
right, so for making you more

887
00:45:42.300 --> 00:45:43.600
effective, that sounds good.

888
00:45:44.500 --> 00:45:47.800
Does that mean that I can also Proctor more people simultaneously?

889
00:45:49.300 --> 00:45:52.300
So, um that that's an interesting question

890
00:45:52.300 --> 00:45:55.300
and there's a lot of lot of valid viewpoints out there a

891
00:45:55.300 --> 00:45:59.300
lot of smart people with with viewpoints on my my take

892
00:45:58.300 --> 00:46:01.300
on it is in I I

893
00:46:01.300 --> 00:46:04.100
kind of two opinions on it. One one is that in a

894
00:46:04.100 --> 00:46:07.300
real time scenario? I don't think AI can increase the

895
00:46:07.300 --> 00:46:10.600
amount that of candidates that you can Proctor because it's

896
00:46:10.600 --> 00:46:13.400
gonna draw your attention to something but in a real-time

897
00:46:13.400 --> 00:46:16.800
proctoring environment, you can't stop everybody everybody stop

898
00:46:16.800 --> 00:46:19.300
right now. Let me go look at this can and see what they're

899
00:46:19.300 --> 00:46:22.300
doing. I still need to be able to make sure I'm dispersing my

900
00:46:22.300 --> 00:46:25.300
attention to all the candidates are currently proctoring. Now, I

901
00:46:25.300 --> 00:46:28.100
feel differently in a recording reviews scenario because there you

902
00:46:28.100 --> 00:46:31.100
have control over over videos that you're watching and you can

903
00:46:31.100 --> 00:46:34.300
go and see it and it makes it it does make a good difference there.

904
00:46:34.300 --> 00:46:37.600
So but I would say in a real time proctoring scenario.

905
00:46:37.600 --> 00:46:40.400
I my opinion is that I don't I

906
00:46:40.400 --> 00:46:43.200
don't think that it can increase the number of candidates that

907
00:46:43.200 --> 00:46:46.900
you should be watching real time. Again, that is that is an opinion. So all

908
00:46:46.900 --> 00:46:49.100
right, what's funny about that is that?

909
00:46:49.300 --> 00:46:52.500
Thank Chris an email this morning about you know, somebody who's

910
00:46:52.500 --> 00:46:55.300
very smart in the industry who who just

911
00:46:55.300 --> 00:46:58.300
he said in his article that it he could

912
00:46:58.300 --> 00:47:01.500
Proctor 300% more three times more. So there

913
00:47:01.500 --> 00:47:05.200
is different people of different opinions and people are probably taking

914
00:47:04.200 --> 00:47:07.500
advantage of it. But I think I agree with Chris. It's

915
00:47:07.500 --> 00:47:08.400
a it's

916
00:47:09.300 --> 00:47:12.400
Only so many people you can really pay attention to in real

917
00:47:12.400 --> 00:47:15.000
time and you know adding this one more

918
00:47:15.400 --> 00:47:18.800
layer just even adds more things. They're watching. So. Mm-hmm.

919
00:47:21.300 --> 00:47:22.100
All right. Well

920
00:47:23.200 --> 00:47:26.800
Thank you guys for sharing your opinions about that. All right,

921
00:47:26.800 --> 00:47:29.100
so Pat, we saw a little bit of this

922
00:47:29.100 --> 00:47:32.400
in the overview video, but can you say a little bit more about

923
00:47:32.400 --> 00:47:35.600
what features of the AI Proctor assists

924
00:47:35.600 --> 00:47:38.000
that you decided to use for its?

925
00:47:39.300 --> 00:47:42.500
Yeah, so, um, you know, most of the industry

926
00:47:42.500 --> 00:47:45.100
is kind of following sort of the same path. In fact, most of us

927
00:47:45.100 --> 00:47:48.600
are using sort of the same base level toolkits even

928
00:47:48.600 --> 00:47:51.200
behind the scenes. So the first thing

929
00:47:51.200 --> 00:47:54.200
we wanted to do is sort of, you know have a low-key approach like we're

930
00:47:54.200 --> 00:47:57.500
not cooking anybody out. We're not doing anything like that. We're just highlighting the candidates.

931
00:47:57.500 --> 00:48:00.500
So you might have seen it in sort of the preliminary video. It's

932
00:48:00.500 --> 00:48:03.800
sort of like a little yellow around each candidate or something's

933
00:48:03.800 --> 00:48:06.900
happening and then we're tagging and time stamping

934
00:48:06.900 --> 00:48:09.100
the video so that if you ever come back and look at

935
00:48:09.100 --> 00:48:12.500
it, you know at any one point we know exactly at which

936
00:48:12.500 --> 00:48:15.200
point that particular Behavior began in which point that

937
00:48:15.200 --> 00:48:18.100
particular Behavior ended. So we we can tell

938
00:48:18.100 --> 00:48:22.100
that we wanted to support the Proctor assistant

939
00:48:21.100 --> 00:48:24.100
integration for both live rewind which is

940
00:48:24.100 --> 00:48:27.600
why you know, you can go back and look at it right while you're doing the the proc

941
00:48:27.600 --> 00:48:30.700
during and in a historical perspective, which

942
00:48:30.700 --> 00:48:33.300
also brought into that whole concept of two camera,

943
00:48:33.300 --> 00:48:36.200
right? Because one camera might be picking up something and the other

944
00:48:36.200 --> 00:48:39.000
camera might not so you have you have things like that that you have

945
00:48:39.000 --> 00:48:39.100
to

946
00:48:39.300 --> 00:48:42.100
Deal with that as well. So so we wanted to support it

947
00:48:42.100 --> 00:48:45.400
for both live proctoring and the record and review and then the

948
00:48:45.400 --> 00:48:48.300
other thing that we're doing and this is actually one where the secure

949
00:48:48.300 --> 00:48:51.200
browser is involved. We use Proctor assist not

950
00:48:51.200 --> 00:48:54.100
only to alert to AI type stuff but we

951
00:48:54.100 --> 00:48:57.300
wanted to solve that problem where if they have an extra

952
00:48:57.300 --> 00:49:00.300
keyboard or Mouse and they're using that keyboard and a

953
00:49:00.300 --> 00:49:03.300
mouse maybe in a different room. We wanted to basically detect it

954
00:49:03.300 --> 00:49:06.400
because almost everybody who has a laptop has two

955
00:49:06.400 --> 00:49:09.900
keyboards right and two mice we all have that on our laptop in

956
00:49:09.900 --> 00:49:12.500
here. So what really matters is when two

957
00:49:12.500 --> 00:49:15.400
people are using it, right? So you have an unexpected use for

958
00:49:15.400 --> 00:49:18.600
somebody else is coming in in that particular case. We also

959
00:49:18.600 --> 00:49:21.400
use Proctor assist to say hey something's happening here.

960
00:49:21.400 --> 00:49:24.400
This is what we're seeing. Maybe you want to, you

961
00:49:24.400 --> 00:49:26.400
know, do something about that. Mm-hmm.

962
00:49:30.800 --> 00:49:34.600
All right. So Chris previously

963
00:49:33.600 --> 00:49:36.700
Pat referenced, you

964
00:49:36.700 --> 00:49:39.400
know different privacy and legal issues with using

965
00:49:39.400 --> 00:49:39.900
AI.

966
00:49:40.800 --> 00:49:43.600
And I believe that we've also heard some concerns from

967
00:49:43.600 --> 00:49:46.500
programs about this as well. So I know that

968
00:49:46.500 --> 00:49:49.400
its technically supports this, but I want

969
00:49:49.400 --> 00:49:52.400
to know what do you think, you know should programs use

970
00:49:52.400 --> 00:49:55.600
Proctor assist as part of their security toolkit?

971
00:49:57.200 --> 00:50:00.100
So that's a good question. And I think this kind of

972
00:50:00.100 --> 00:50:03.300
goes along with with some of the other way. We've been answering these

973
00:50:03.300 --> 00:50:06.400
which is it really depends on on your program's needs

974
00:50:06.400 --> 00:50:09.300
and how important Security is to your program. And

975
00:50:09.300 --> 00:50:13.100
really what what you're ultimate goal. Is there with our

976
00:50:12.100 --> 00:50:15.200
solution we wanted to make sure it wasn't invasive and

977
00:50:15.200 --> 00:50:18.700
keep it lightweight. We also recognize that people are

978
00:50:18.700 --> 00:50:21.900
programs are going to have different needs. And so we made everything configurable.

979
00:50:21.900 --> 00:50:24.900
We made a configurable as to whether or not you you

980
00:50:24.900 --> 00:50:27.300
can or you you use the

981
00:50:27.300 --> 00:50:30.400
Proctor assist functionality. They AI features are not we made a

982
00:50:30.400 --> 00:50:33.100
configurable as to which specific ones. So if you do want

983
00:50:33.100 --> 00:50:36.300
to use the Proctor assist stuff, but maybe you only want one or two of the checks.

984
00:50:36.300 --> 00:50:39.500
We have that ability to turn it on at the check level two and we

985
00:50:39.500 --> 00:50:42.300
also have the ability to control sensitivity. So we really we really

986
00:50:42.300 --> 00:50:45.300
wanted to just accommodate that that program's decision making and

987
00:50:45.300 --> 00:50:49.100
allow them to to choose what's gonna be right for them. We do

988
00:50:48.100 --> 00:50:51.500
think there is there is value in practice

989
00:50:51.500 --> 00:50:54.500
just like the two cameras, but it's really gonna it's

990
00:50:54.500 --> 00:50:57.100
really gonna need to just is it something that makes

991
00:50:57.200 --> 00:51:00.300
For your program and the comfort of a

992
00:51:00.300 --> 00:51:02.100
program with an AI check. Yeah.

993
00:51:04.200 --> 00:51:07.600
Okay, so it sounds like ultimately you think it's a good idea. But you

994
00:51:07.600 --> 00:51:10.300
know with all the other things in consideration, too.

995
00:51:10.300 --> 00:51:13.600
It's it's nice to hear that, you know a program can configure.

996
00:51:14.600 --> 00:51:17.500
Exactly what they want to use. We know

997
00:51:17.500 --> 00:51:20.600
some programs actually have rules against using Ai

998
00:51:20.600 --> 00:51:23.300
and sort of really sort of form. So, you know,

999
00:51:23.300 --> 00:51:26.200
it's that may change and I think it will as sort of

1000
00:51:26.200 --> 00:51:29.400
the nuances of it, but right now some programs just can't

1001
00:51:29.400 --> 00:51:31.300
use it because of their corporate rules.

1002
00:51:32.100 --> 00:51:35.400
Sure. Yeah, I'll be interesting to see how that evolves because AI is

1003
00:51:35.400 --> 00:51:37.600
popping up everywhere, you know everywhere.

1004
00:51:39.600 --> 00:51:42.500
We're better for words, right? All right,

1005
00:51:42.500 --> 00:51:45.100
I have one more question for you kind of

1006
00:51:45.100 --> 00:51:46.600
a big one. It's an opinion question.

1007
00:51:47.400 --> 00:51:51.000
Do you think in your opinion will AI replace human

1008
00:51:50.700 --> 00:51:53.700
Proctors or just eventually replace live

1009
00:51:53.700 --> 00:51:54.800
proctoring altogether?

1010
00:51:55.700 --> 00:51:56.100
What do you think?

1011
00:51:57.100 --> 00:52:00.400
So I have to say yes, at least at one level because people

1012
00:52:00.400 --> 00:52:03.500
are doing it. So yes for some programs because there

1013
00:52:03.500 --> 00:52:07.600
are programs that are actually live today using you

1014
00:52:07.600 --> 00:52:10.300
know, AI only but I

1015
00:52:10.300 --> 00:52:13.500
will tell you that it's going to be limited because some countries

1016
00:52:13.500 --> 00:52:16.100
are not going to let you do it things like the

1017
00:52:16.100 --> 00:52:19.400
EU probably the US so where the

1018
00:52:19.400 --> 00:52:22.400
privacy laws kick in so it's going to be limited. I

1019
00:52:22.400 --> 00:52:25.600
I think you know, let's just stick with the US for

1020
00:52:25.600 --> 00:52:28.100
a minute human proctoring is gonna be here for a

1021
00:52:28.100 --> 00:52:31.400
long long time. It's not going away. I I

1022
00:52:31.400 --> 00:52:34.400
also think you know, if you ask me my opinion in other

1023
00:52:34.400 --> 00:52:37.800
words, if it's my program then I want humans

1024
00:52:37.800 --> 00:52:40.600
to be always a part of the decision makers.

1025
00:52:40.600 --> 00:52:43.400
So, you know, the answer is no it

1026
00:52:43.400 --> 00:52:46.000
should be but I think there is some yes in there and not you know,

1027
00:52:46.100 --> 00:52:50.000
I don't agree with that. Actually, I think it's wrong interesting. Well,

1028
00:52:49.200 --> 00:52:52.700
actually a question just popped up that that's

1029
00:52:52.700 --> 00:52:55.000
sort of related to this. You know, you mentioned, you know,

1030
00:52:55.800 --> 00:52:56.900
at least in the US you don't think

1031
00:52:57.100 --> 00:53:00.500
It's probably going to ever go live proctoring will

1032
00:53:00.500 --> 00:53:03.400
probably never totally go away. But what would you like? What

1033
00:53:03.400 --> 00:53:06.300
do you think about the difference between the use of AI in the US

1034
00:53:06.300 --> 00:53:08.200
versus other parts of the world? Can you?

1035
00:53:08.900 --> 00:53:11.200
Give us any perspective on that. Yeah, so I

1036
00:53:11.200 --> 00:53:14.600
mean I get and Chris does too. We get emails from companies, you

1037
00:53:14.600 --> 00:53:17.200
know about companies all the time. Somebody says, hey

1038
00:53:17.200 --> 00:53:21.200
look at this company and they have you know, they have some system when

1039
00:53:20.200 --> 00:53:23.600
I saw last week I think was in India and

1040
00:53:23.600 --> 00:53:26.700
it was completely 100% Ai and

1041
00:53:26.700 --> 00:53:29.700
you know that looked like they had a nice user interface and some company.

1042
00:53:29.700 --> 00:53:32.700
I had never heard of and you know, they're trying to break out and they're

1043
00:53:32.700 --> 00:53:36.000
clearly delivering today. So I

1044
00:53:35.200 --> 00:53:38.700
think in a specially your non-so

1045
00:53:38.700 --> 00:53:41.400
called Western countries, you know, the non

1046
00:53:41.400 --> 00:53:44.400
Europe non-us things like that. You are you know, you

1047
00:53:44.400 --> 00:53:47.700
are going to see it but you know,

1048
00:53:47.700 --> 00:53:50.200
there's more and more pressure and I think some of

1049
00:53:50.200 --> 00:53:53.300
the problems they're gonna solve right, you know, they might get better and better with

1050
00:53:53.300 --> 00:53:56.500
the eye shape or the skin tones and things like that. But

1051
00:53:56.500 --> 00:53:59.500
the real question is does it, you

1052
00:53:59.500 --> 00:54:02.500
know, does it ever really get fair? And you

1053
00:54:02.500 --> 00:54:05.100
know, I don't I don't think so. I think there are people you know

1054
00:54:05.100 --> 00:54:08.200
who just look away to think right and that

1055
00:54:08.200 --> 00:54:08.700
does not mean

1056
00:54:08.900 --> 00:54:11.300
are cheating. So how do you handle stuff like that? You

1057
00:54:11.300 --> 00:54:14.700
know, so you you start making compromises and when

1058
00:54:14.700 --> 00:54:17.200
I say compromise is compromises in your AI to say wow,

1059
00:54:17.200 --> 00:54:20.400
that's not maybe something I want to flag and So eventually you

1060
00:54:20.400 --> 00:54:23.200
compromise your right out of where you can really use it. So but

1061
00:54:23.200 --> 00:54:26.700
I do think it's an important part is, you know, this reminds me of the whole question of

1062
00:54:26.700 --> 00:54:29.300
you know, should should there

1063
00:54:29.300 --> 00:54:30.200
be umpires in baseball?

1064
00:54:30.800 --> 00:54:33.600
But I mean, I'm a baseball fan. So, you know,

1065
00:54:33.600 --> 00:54:36.100
like, you know, should you have umpires to call balls and

1066
00:54:36.100 --> 00:54:39.600
Strikes because computers can do it better, you know and and more and

1067
00:54:39.600 --> 00:54:42.200
more instant replays becoming a part of that but we already have

1068
00:54:42.200 --> 00:54:45.400
instant replay as part of our solution and remote proctoring. So

1069
00:54:45.400 --> 00:54:48.300
that's where two camera comes in. So I you know, I'm pretty comfortable

1070
00:54:48.300 --> 00:54:51.100
where we are right now and I think you know, it's the right

1071
00:54:51.100 --> 00:54:51.500
way to go.

1072
00:54:53.100 --> 00:54:53.300
Great.

1073
00:54:54.800 --> 00:54:57.200
All right. Well, we are we have five

1074
00:54:57.200 --> 00:55:01.200
minutes to go. There is one question that wrote was raised

1075
00:55:00.200 --> 00:55:03.200
back in the secure browser section. So I think I

1076
00:55:03.200 --> 00:55:06.200
can keep that up. Now if anyone else has any questions you can

1077
00:55:06.200 --> 00:55:09.200
stick them in the Q&A now and if there are no more

1078
00:55:09.200 --> 00:55:10.400
questions, we'll wrap up after this.

1079
00:55:11.400 --> 00:55:14.000
So Pat and Chris, whoever wants to

1080
00:55:14.100 --> 00:55:17.400
take the lead on this we have a question in about whether there are any additional

1081
00:55:17.400 --> 00:55:21.500
Technologies or websites that that

1082
00:55:20.500 --> 00:55:23.700
we can or should be monitoring or

1083
00:55:23.700 --> 00:55:26.900
at least be aware of from a security perspective.

1084
00:55:26.900 --> 00:55:29.000
So for example, YouTube, you know

1085
00:55:29.400 --> 00:55:32.600
finding videos on there of people posting chat GPT

1086
00:55:32.600 --> 00:55:35.300
Reddit, like are there any other resources or

1087
00:55:35.300 --> 00:55:38.100
Technologies or websites that you want to

1088
00:55:38.100 --> 00:55:42.000
share? You know, I'll let Chris answer this one because I

1089
00:55:41.100 --> 00:55:44.100
know he checks this stuff pretty

1090
00:55:44.100 --> 00:55:47.000
regularly. So maybe Chris you gonna give us give us a

1091
00:55:47.100 --> 00:55:48.000
way all your secrets Chris.

1092
00:55:48.500 --> 00:55:51.200
It now I will admit though. You

1093
00:55:51.200 --> 00:55:54.300
already said my favorite on which is Reddit. Um, but at least

1094
00:55:54.300 --> 00:55:56.400
what I've been seeing is these things aren't

1095
00:55:57.200 --> 00:56:00.500
these things aren't really discussed out. Oh well, so another one

1096
00:56:00.500 --> 00:56:03.400
that I really that I really like is it's a it's called

1097
00:56:03.400 --> 00:56:06.700
Unknown cheats and what that is is it's a

1098
00:56:06.700 --> 00:56:09.500
video game. It's geared towards video games, but

1099
00:56:09.500 --> 00:56:12.300
kind of like what Pat said early when when we

1100
00:56:12.300 --> 00:56:17.000
start looking at these type of attacks, we started looking at what like

1101
00:56:16.200 --> 00:56:19.200
the video game industry has been dealing with some of

1102
00:56:19.200 --> 00:56:22.600
this stuff for a while. People are manipulating their games, right? And so

1103
00:56:22.600 --> 00:56:25.200
it you there's you're dealing with almost the same

1104
00:56:25.200 --> 00:56:29.400
user base there and people that are Technical and

1105
00:56:28.400 --> 00:56:31.600
able to to do that kind of program and

1106
00:56:31.600 --> 00:56:34.500
that gets you in your middle middle and upper tears of hacking or

1107
00:56:34.500 --> 00:56:37.300
selling a hack. So I do like that one

1108
00:56:37.300 --> 00:56:40.300
Reddit is reddit is always good. I mean

1109
00:56:40.300 --> 00:56:43.400
you can go that you can go you can go there right now and just

1110
00:56:43.400 --> 00:56:46.400
see some threads that are dedicated to it. But one thing that you are going

1111
00:56:46.400 --> 00:56:49.100
to notice is that a lot of these things

1112
00:56:49.100 --> 00:56:52.400
are more just they they do enough just

1113
00:56:52.400 --> 00:56:55.600
to get the word out. And then from there you move

1114
00:56:55.600 --> 00:56:57.000
it over to a Discord or a

1115
00:56:57.200 --> 00:57:00.500
Am or something like that and so so it becomes

1116
00:57:00.500 --> 00:57:03.500
tricky to to monitor those things but on

1117
00:57:03.500 --> 00:57:07.000
the Chris. Yeah how people would a Discord and say help

1118
00:57:06.100 --> 00:57:10.000
me out here. So so

1119
00:57:09.400 --> 00:57:12.300
a Discord is basically you these people

1120
00:57:12.300 --> 00:57:15.800
cannot you anybody can just kind of set up their own server and you're just

1121
00:57:15.800 --> 00:57:18.200
making your own kind of chat area. Like it has

1122
00:57:18.200 --> 00:57:21.700
its own framework and everything, but you can set up different channels and and you

1123
00:57:21.700 --> 00:57:24.500
have your hashtags and everything in there and and some of

1124
00:57:24.500 --> 00:57:27.300
these get get really crazy. I've seen somewhere that they

1125
00:57:27.300 --> 00:57:30.200
have their own support ticket queue. Um, and they have they have

1126
00:57:30.200 --> 00:57:33.800
somebody assigned to address the tickets. They have their developer that

1127
00:57:33.800 --> 00:57:36.300
addresses these attacks and every in and

1128
00:57:36.300 --> 00:57:39.200
they got it's a whole business around it and there's a

1129
00:57:39.200 --> 00:57:42.400
whole bunch of like like I'm sure this audience is already.

1130
00:57:42.400 --> 00:57:45.700
Well, we're like, yeah, you have your like Honeypot Concepts and honey pots

1131
00:57:45.700 --> 00:57:48.900
iconcepts and all that for like monitoring monitoring content

1132
00:57:48.900 --> 00:57:51.300
that but these these things

1133
00:57:51.300 --> 00:57:54.800
they they're they these are legitimate. There's

1134
00:57:54.800 --> 00:57:56.900
a lot of legitimate looking websites and a lot of

1135
00:57:57.900 --> 00:58:00.400
Practically legitimate but I don't call

1136
00:58:00.400 --> 00:58:03.900
him legitimate but they're being professionally run with and

1137
00:58:03.900 --> 00:58:06.400
with how they're doing this and and so Discord provides

1138
00:58:06.400 --> 00:58:09.100
a platform for that and telegram will it gets

1139
00:58:09.100 --> 00:58:12.900
you all that anonymity and those type of things on but it's it's

1140
00:58:12.900 --> 00:58:15.500
really interesting and and you don't have to look too

1141
00:58:15.500 --> 00:58:18.500
hard out there to find this stuff. You know, I'm from

1142
00:58:18.500 --> 00:58:21.400
a money perspective. We we see things, you know, they start

1143
00:58:21.400 --> 00:58:24.100
around 250 dollars to get a you know to get

1144
00:58:24.100 --> 00:58:27.300
a piece of software that you can run on your machine to bypass. Let's say it's something like

1145
00:58:27.300 --> 00:58:31.300
that, you know, well thousand of those that's 250,000

1146
00:58:30.300 --> 00:58:33.500
a year. We're we're talking about

1147
00:58:33.500 --> 00:58:36.500
this is a multi-million dollar industry at a

1148
00:58:36.500 --> 00:58:39.600
minimum. Right right now just for the and then

1149
00:58:39.600 --> 00:58:42.200
when you get into the the big hacks where they take it for you

1150
00:58:42.200 --> 00:58:45.300
and and replace you some of those are like they charge you

1151
00:58:45.800 --> 00:58:48.600
$5,000 or $4,000 and you know, you know,

1152
00:58:48.600 --> 00:58:51.800
so it's it's a big big business and there's

1153
00:58:51.800 --> 00:58:54.300
a lot of money involved and whenever there's a lot of money you get

1154
00:58:54.300 --> 00:58:56.000
a lot of smart people involved.

1155
00:58:57.900 --> 00:59:00.300
Yeah, this is all very much over my head

1156
00:59:00.300 --> 00:59:03.200
when you started talking about the telegrams Chris, I you know.

1157
00:59:04.800 --> 00:59:07.400
Like my eyes glazed over. No, but that's that's so that's

1158
00:59:07.400 --> 00:59:07.800
so interesting.

1159
00:59:09.400 --> 00:59:12.600
All right. One last question came in our secure

1160
00:59:12.600 --> 00:59:15.500
browsers the bare minimum that a certification program should

1161
00:59:15.500 --> 00:59:15.700
have.

1162
00:59:17.100 --> 00:59:20.900
No, I mean a secure browser only helps you if it's if

1163
00:59:20.900 --> 00:59:23.400
it's got a combination Proctor involved if you're

1164
00:59:23.400 --> 00:59:26.100
putting a secure browser at home and they're running at

1165
00:59:26.100 --> 00:59:29.200
home like at home typed test you may

1166
00:59:29.200 --> 00:59:32.400
as well not even have a secure browser. If you're trying to protect content, it's you

1167
00:59:32.400 --> 00:59:35.100
know, it's yes, you can make it harder for them to do

1168
00:59:35.100 --> 00:59:38.600
something. But you know, it's kind of pointless. So secure browser

1169
00:59:38.600 --> 00:59:41.100
is not enough fun. It's own you need

1170
00:59:41.100 --> 00:59:42.700
the remote Proctor Center something.

1171
00:59:45.300 --> 00:59:48.400
Well, great. Well, thank you so much Pat. Thank you so much Chris.

1172
00:59:48.400 --> 00:59:51.600
This concludes today's webinar. I hope

1173
00:59:51.600 --> 00:59:54.400
you all found this discussion as enlightening as

1174
00:59:54.400 --> 00:59:57.300
I did and you know, if there's anything that you'd like

1175
00:59:57.300 --> 01:00:00.400
anything more that you'd like to learn about this

1176
01:00:00.400 --> 01:00:03.200
topic, you know reach out to us get in touch. We'd be

1177
01:00:03.200 --> 01:00:04.300
happy to continue the conversation.

1178
01:00:05.900 --> 01:00:09.100
All right everyone. Thank you so much again for joining. Thanks, Sandy.

1179
01:00:08.100 --> 01:00:11.200
Thanks everybody. Thank you. Bye.